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not causal) value through out-of-sample prediction. However,
we rarely produce such demonstrations of practical value for
our regression research.  As such, we simply cannot say whether
we are better off with or without regression-type research in
these contexts.
To the extent that our discipline values causal over de-
scriptive knowledge, we must consider the possibility that re-
gression-type studies of observational data have been signifi-
cantly overvalued and overrepresented in our history over the
last several decades. It may be time to shift some portion of
resources such as funding, training, institutional support, and
pages in our journals away from regression-type studies and
toward case studies, experiments, natural experiments, and re-
lated approaches.
Note
1 See, e.g, a symposium of ten articles on U.S. election forecasting
in the October, 2008, issue of PS: Political Science & Politics.
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improved education.
The second source of uncertainty that is special to obser-
vational studies is the instability of regression results across
different sets of pre-treatment conditioning variables. Random-
ized experiments do not exhibit this instability because in large
samples, different treatment groups are guaranteed to have
similar distributions for all possible pre-treatment variables.
However, despite these two complications, it is certainly
the case that observational data allow us to “update our pri-
ors” regarding effects. To see this, it is helpful to more closely
consider a single observation (country) from the democratic
consolidation example. Suppose we only know that this coun-
try is poor, the “effect” of income is a comparison between the
outcome for this country (relapse or consolidation) under their
current state of income (poor), and the outcome we would
have observed (relapse or consolidation) if we had somehow
increased income (rich). There are three possible effects of
increasing income from poor to rich: negative (consolidation
to relapse), positive (relapse to consolidation), no effect (re-
lapse to relapse or consolidation to consolidation). Our priors
in this case might represent probabilities over these three ef-
fects.1
Now suppose that we observe the outcome variable for
this country, and in fact this poor democracy relapsed into
authoritarianism. For this country, we now know that increas-
ing income (from poor to rich) would not have had a “negative
effect” (from consolidation to relapse), because we observed
relapse when poor. Increasing income could only have had
either a positive effect (from relapse to consolidation) or no
effect (from relapse to relapse). Therefore, if our prior beliefs
put any positive probability on a negative effect, we must
update because we now know that there is no probability of a
negative effect for this country.
Furthermore, note that our method for ruling out the “nega-
tive effects” relied only on our knowledge that this country
relapsed when poor—we did not impose any constraints on
the outcome we would have observed if this country had been
rich. Therefore, we can rule out negative effects regardless of
the exact method of manipulation. To be specific, for this coun-
try we know that the effect of increasing income due to discov-
ering oil, or the effect of increasing income due to improving
education, or the effect of increasing income through any other
means, could not have had a negative effect—it is logically
impossible to move from consolidation to relapse if we know
that the starting point is relapse.
While these sorts of logical arguments are straightfor-
ward when considering individual cases, they can also be used
to consider the limits of instability for regression results. These
limits provide conservative estimates of uncertainty. In the
next section, I provide a stylized example.
The Limits of Instability for Regression Slopes with
Observational Data: A Stylized Example
While the potential instability of regression results with
observational data is well known, it is helpful to consider a
stylized example in order to explore the source and the limits of
this instability. Figure 1 (a) presents an example of a simple
regression. In this case, both X and Y are dichotomous and
only take on the values 0 and 1, therefore this plot can also be
thought of as a 2x2 table (the points in the plot have been
jittered so all 12 of them can be seen).2 Notice that the arrange-
ment of points in the plot implies a positive regression slope of
1/3. Two thirds of the X=1 points have Y=1, while one third of
the X=0 points have Y=1, so the difference is 1/3.3
Of course, the regression slope of 1/3 that we see in Fig-
ure 1 (a) merely represents a simple regression result. We could
get different regression results by conditioning on a third vari-
able. For example, consider a hypothetical dichotomous con-
ditioning variable that takes the values “a” and “b.” Figure 1
(b) presents the same data that were presented in Figure 1 (a),
except now the values of this conditioning variable are repre-
sented on the plot. The conditional regression analysis (based
on this dichotomous conditioning variable) works by fitting
two a separate regression lines—one to the “a” points and
one to the “b” points. For this example, we see that the slope is
zero for both of these lines, and therefore our conditional re-
gression estimate is zero (quite different from the 1/3 we got in
the simple regression).
This instability of regression results is well known to most
practitioners, and we can get many different answers by con-
sidering alternative conditioning variables. For example, Fig-
ure 1 (c) demonstrates how we can get a very small regression
estimate. This plot presents the same data again with a differ-
ent conditioning variable that is trichotomous (taking the val-
ues “a”, “b”, and “c”). In Figure 1 (c), the regression slope is
zero for both the points that take the conditioning value “a”
and for the points that take the conditioning value “c.” How-
ever, the regression slope is -1 for the points taking the condi-
tioning value “b.” In a model with different conditional slopes
for different observations (i.e., a model with interactions), we
obtain the overall estimate by averaging across the condi-
tional slopes according to the proportion of observations as-
sociated with each slope (Cochrane 1968). Using weights ac-
cording to the proportion of the “a,” “b,” and “c” observa-
tions, the conditional estimate is the average slope, which is
-2/12.4
Similarly, Figure 1 (d) demonstrates how we can get a very
large regression estimate. This plot presents the same data
again with a different trichotomous conditioning variable. In
this plot, the regression slope is zero for both the points that
take the conditioning value “a” and for the points that take the
conditioning value “c.” However, the regression slope is 1 for
the points taking the conditioning value “b.” Using weights
according to the proportion of observations taking each value
of the conditioning variable, the average conditional estimate
is the average slope, which is 6/12.
Again, it is not remarkable that Figures 1 (a), (b), (c), and
(d) demonstrate the instability of regression results. What is
remarkable, or at least is less well known, is that the plots in
Figure 1 demonstrate a limit to this instability.
To see this, first imagine all possible conditioning vari-
ables that are not collinear with X. That is, if you are allowed to
label the 12 points in any manner you wish (“a,” “b,” “c,” “d,”
…), so long as each label has a representative in the X=0 and
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Unconditional Estimate = 1/3 Average Conditional Estimate = 0
(a) (b)
Average Conditional Estimate = -2/12 Average Conditional Estimate = 6/12
(c) (d)
X=1 groups, there is no labeling that will produce an average
slope smaller than -2/12  (as in Figure 1 (c)) or greater than 6/12
(as in Figure 1 (d)). In other words, if we restrict ourselves to
conditioning variables that are not collinear with X, there is no
set of conditioning variables that would produce an average
slope estimate that is smaller than -2/12 or greater than 6/12—
there is a limit to the instability of the regression results when
we assume an absence of collinearity.
In fact, even if we allow conditioning variables that are
collinear with X (i.e., we are allowed to label the 12 points in
any manner we wish), the average slope must at least be -1/3
and can at most be 2/3—there is a limit to the instability of the
regression results. This limit is often known as the Manski
bounds (Manski 1990, 2003). In the language of the previous
section, we can rule out average slopes smaller than -1/3 or
larger than 2/3.
Development, Democracy, and
Gerring’s Proposed Standards?
If the Manski bounds demonstrate limits to the instability
of regression results, then messy observational data may add
Figure 1
to our knowledge of a given subject area—even if we cannot
provide a single answer, we can rule out some answers. How-
ever, while we learn something from messy data, we may be
unsatisfied by the wide range of answers we obtain. Without
additional information or assumptions, we cannot state that
any particular slope estimate (or set of slope estimates) in the
bounds is more likely than any other. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, without additional information or assumptions, we can
never rule out a slope of zero, and therefore we can never
establish the presence of an effect.
As an example, consider the previously discussed result
on democratic consolidation. Has this finding added to our
knowledge on the subject? In light of the stylized example
above, the answer seems to be yes. A positive correlation be-
tween development and retained democracy does not conclu-
sively indicate a positive causal effect; however, it does rule
out highly negative effects.5
However, while the Manski bounds demonstrate conclu-
sively that we learn something from this observational data
(because they represent all the results we might get from any
conceivable set of conditioning variables), they are likely to be
x x
xx
Y
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Y
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conservative because they only utilize data on the explanatory
variable and the outcome variable. By utilizing other variables,
we may be able to tighten these bounds, but only when the
information from these variables is combined with additional
assumptions.
As an example, consider the typical practice of running
regressions with different sets of conditioning variables, and
using the range of results we get from these regressions as
bounds. These bounds will be valid only if we assume that one
of our sets of conditioning variables is the correct set, or if we
assume that the answer we would get from the correct set of
variables is contained within these bounds. In other words,
the conditioning variables may allow us to tighten the Manski
bounds, but only if we are willing to make assumptions on the
basis of these variables.6
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by many of the regres-
sion critics cited by Gerring, these alternative bounds (the
range of estimates produced by running different regression
specifications) are likely to be anti-conservative. Because re-
gression results can, in practice, only utilize non-collinear sets
of measured confounders, we will often find it untenable to
believe that any of the regressions we have run use the correct
set of conditioning variables.
This leaves the analyst in a quandary. Given our data, we
have a conservative answer (the Manski bounds) and an anti-
conservative answer (the bounds on regression results), but
we may not have a “plausible” answer. In order to move for-
ward, the analyst must be willing to make and defend assump-
tions. In some cases, the bounds on regression results are
expanded by making assumptions about the effects of unob-
served conditioning variables (Brumback et al. 2004, Lin et al.
1998, Rosenbaum 1987, 2002, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In
others, the Manski bounds are tightened by making a variety
of assumptions (Manski 2003), sometimes in a Bayesian frame-
work (Quinn 2011).
Specifying and defending these assumptions is hard work,
and we may never arrive at a set of assumptions that will be
agreeable to all readers—messy data lead to messy conclu-
sions. Still, this sort of work with messy observational data
can lead to useful conclusions—see for example the Cornfield
et al. (1959) study on smoking and lung cancer. It is unfortu-
nate that typical practice eschews this hard work and presents
only the anti-conservative bounds implicit in regression re-
sults.
Notes
1 More typically, we might propose that these probabilities follow
a Dirichlet distribution, and specify our priors on the parameters of
this distribution.
2 Linearity is justified in this case due to the binary treatment.
3 To avoid concerns about a lack of significance, we can interpret
the points in this plot to merely represent the proportions in the cells
of a 2x2 table. Therefore, the sample size might actually be quite
large.
4 This process of averaging over the slopes of regression lines in an
interactive model is sometimes known as direct adjustment (Cochran
1968), and is the most straightforward way to estimate an average
effect using an interactive regression model.
5 With a continuous explanatory variable, the causal question of
interest must be stated more precisely in order to estimate effects or
specify the regression bounds. Often, parametric assumptions are
made that obviate the need for this precision.
6 It is worth noting that this is also true for post-treatment vari-
ables, although standard regression analysis cannot be used when
conditioning on post-treatment variables. Glynn and Quinn (2011)
provides an example on the use of post-treatment variables to tighten
the Manski bounds.
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I have encountered what John Gerring aptly describes as
a fear of “the specter of methodological perfectionism” in my
students and colleagues.  In my view this fear imputes to meth-
odologists more optimism on the perfectibility of research meth-
ods and more pessimism on the contributions of imperfect
methods than most of us actually hold, but like any phobia,
this fear is sufficiently real in the minds of those who hold it
that it deserves remediation.
My own view, similar to that in Gerring’s Social Science
